Summary: Selection in Public Service: Evidence from School Board Elections

This brief was developed using Microsoft Copilot and edited by Charlotte Sutcliffe, Duke undergraduate research assistant; for full text and references see 

Park, G., Billings, S. B., Singleton, J. D., & Macartney, H. (2024). Selection into public service: Evidence from School Board elections. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4822297 

Background:

This study investigates whether individuals elected to local school boards in North Carolina use their positions to benefit their own neighborhoods, and whether political affiliation influences these effects. School board members are typically unpaid or minimally compensated, raising questions about their motivations for seeking office. The researchers focus on narrowly decided elections, to compare neighborhoods of winning and losing candidates. They analyze changes in home values, school demographics, and educational outcomes to assess whether elected members influence local public goods, particularly school quality and composition. 

Findings:

The study finds that neighborhoods of school board election winners who are not Democrats experience a significant increase in home values, up to 6–8%, relative to those of narrowly losing candidates. This effect is highly localized, confined to the candidate’s immediate Census block group, and is not observed among winners who are Democrats. Importantly, the increase in home values is not driven by improvements in test scores, teacher quality, or school value-added measures. 

Instead, the mechanism appears to be changes in school attendance zones. Neighborhood schools of winners from parties other than Democrats become less racially diverse, with increases in the proportion of white students and decreases in Black, Hispanic, and economically disadvantaged students. These shifts are achieved through boundary adjustments that draw students from more affluent, less diverse neighborhoods. No such changes are observed for winners who are Democrats, suggesting differing motivations or policy priorities. 

Checks confirm that these effects are not due to pre-existing differences, manipulation of election outcomes, or broader neighborhood trends. The findings suggest that non-Democrat-party candidates may be motivated by non-wage private returns, such as increasing their property values, while Democratic party candidates may be more driven by public service motivations. 

Takeaways:

The study reveals that political affiliation influences how school board members use their positions, with non-Democrat-party members more likely to enact policies that benefit their own neighborhoods through school zoning changes. These actions increase local home values but may exacerbate segregation and inequality. Policymakers should consider the implications of partisan school board elections, compensation structures, and candidate recruitment strategies to ensure equitable representation and outcomes. Enhancing transparency and voter awareness of candidate motivations could help align school governance with broader public interests.