
D. T. Stallings
Duke University

Center for Child and Family Policy, Duke University
**Education and the Federal Government**

The responsibility for the education of American children has enjoyed at least a small presence at the Federal level since the middle of the 19th century, usually in the form of independent programs housed in separate Cabinet-level departments. While these early efforts were scattered among offices, various incarnations of a national education office or bureau, beginning with the first established in 1838 for gathering statistics, slowly took root. Despite concerns about an overt federalization of education, locating all of the disparate programs into a single, separate office and giving it department status became the rallying cry of a small but growing minority from as early as the Reconstruction period. The movement gained momentum in the 1950’s and 1960’s as the Federal budget for education eclipsed the budgets of other full-fledged departments, and by the 1970’s, the idea of an independent, Cabinet-level Department of Education was on the verge of realization.

**Establishing a Federal Department of Education**

In the period between 1908 and 1975, more than 130 bills were introduced to form a Department of Education, but it took two additional events toward the end of that period to transform department status for education from dream to reality. The first was the election to the Senate of Abraham Ribicoff, former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), who began work in earnest on the formation of a department in the 1960’s. A second critical factor was the rapid politicization of the National Education Association (NEA) and its growing interest in a stronger Federal presence in education. In 1972, the massive union formed a political action committee, and in 1975 it joined forces with other unions to form the Labor Coalition Clearinghouse (LCC) for election campaigning. Along with other members of the LCC, the NEA released “Needed: A Cabinet Department of Education” in 1975, but its most significant step was to endorse a presidential candidate—Jimmy Carter—for the first time in the history of the organization. The NEA was no small player in the nomination process; the organization averaged 4,000 members per Congressional district, and some estimates suggest that the larger LCC influenced the selection of over 400 of the 3,000 delegates who attended the Democratic National Convention in 1976.

NEA support helped to put Carter in the White House in 1976, but once there it was unclear whether his Administration would follow through on promises to consider department status for education. Education was not a top policy priority for the Carter team, and formation of a new department ran counter to his platform of streamlining the Federal government, but education was important to the candidate on a personal level. After much deliberation and study, Carter finally made good on his campaign promise and endorsed department status for education.
Ribicoff was quick to support the President’s decision, and in March he and Senators Magnuson, Humphrey, Pell, and Nunn introduced yet another Department of Education Organization Act. The bill went to the Governmental Operations Committee, where the debates between October 1977 and May 1978 were at times bitter and acrimonious, but the Committee finally voted the bill to the floor, where the measure passed. The bill did not come up for a vote in the House during the same session, and the entire proceedings began all over again the following year. This time the bill did reach the House, where it passed in a close vote. President Carter signed the bill into law on October 17th, 1979, finally ending a struggle of almost 150 years to establish a Cabinet-level Department of Education.

Building and Preserving the Department (1979–1985)

The Honorable Shirley Hufstedler, selected by President Carter to be the first Secretary of Education, had by law only six months to get the Department up and running. Hufstedler also worked quickly to establish the Department’s agenda, combining her own goals with a panoply of suggestions from critics and supporters alike. One set of goals focused on streamlining and strengthening the political workings of the Federal-state relationship. Hufstedler pledged to reduce regulatory red tape for all Federal programs, with a special emphasis on the complex forms surrounding student aid, and, in what might be construed as a message to the NEA and other large education organizations, she declared that Federal-state-local cooperation should focus on individual students and not educational interest groups. A second set of goals reinforced the notion that the Department would not supersede local control by attempting to impose restrictive regulations. Instead, the Department would encourage the establishment of local-level coalitions and identify, promote, and disseminate exemplary local “success models” that could work across the nation. A third set of goals focused on issues of educational equity. Finally, Hufstedler worked to make education important to the nation again, and she committed to spending some time “go[ing] out on the stump across the country to elevate the consciousness of Americans about the good work classroom teachers do.” Overall, Hufstedler envisioned a Department that was no longer reactive but instead proactive—as she concluded at one point, “The education institutions of the U.S. must change in response to the changing needs of the country”—and in many ways this decision set the tone for the continued growth and development of the Department.

With President Carter’s loss in the 1980 election, many of these goals remained unmet, and it seemed possible that the handwriting was already on the wall for the fledgling Department. Ronald Reagan made it clear that abolishing the Department, which he saw as an intrusion on the local and state control of education, was high on his list of priorities. Though the credit for keeping the Department alive during Reagan’s first term belongs mostly to the next secretary, Terrel Bell, Hufstedler’s success in her dual effort to form the Department out of nothing and to introduce the idea of a national agenda for education established a platform on which her successors could build to keep the Department alive.

Reagan appointed Terrel H. Bell to succeed Hufstedler as Secretary in 1981 and charged him with the task of dismantling the Department, but as the importance and usefulness of a Federal role in education became clearer, the President grew...
more amenable to the idea of preserving the Department. By the end of Bell’s tenure, not only had the execution been stayed, but it seemed also that the Department would remain a fixture in the President’s Cabinet.

Reagan-era education policies were rooted in a desire to return to the original intents of the Founding Fathers with respect to education. Against the background of Reagan’s New Federalism agenda and its sister Economic Recovery Program, which aimed to reduce Federal influence and return power to the states, the Administration planned to move the Education Department away from awarding categorical grants to block grants, and then to eventually eliminate grants entirely until the only function of the Department would be to collect statistics, as it had done in its first incarnation. As bleak as these goals sounded with regard to the future of Federal involvement in public education, Bell noted that he still detected some support from the White House for key programs like the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) Title I program and Title III of the Higher Education Act. Nevertheless, by the end of the Reagan era, many Federal programs did experience heavy budget cuts; even Title I faced $7 billion in cuts, and funding for special program block grants was reduced by 28 percent over the eight-year period.

Under Bell’s guidance, the Department was able to accomplish several of the President’s goals without eliminating the Department altogether. Overall, Federal involvement in education was reduced. In the realm of student loans, Bell oversaw a switch from a relatively restriction-free loan policy to one that required applicants to demonstrate need. He also kept the Department from falling to the level of statistics-gatherer by retaining controversial research programs like the Nixon-era National Institute of Education. These accomplishments notwithstanding, the Bell administration will long be remembered for perhaps its most significant document, *A Nation at Risk* (1983). In stern language, the report described a national education system responsible for a “rising tide of mediocrity.” No legislation was passed as a direct result of the document, but the conclusions did spur many states to begin the first of several waves of reform efforts. *A Nation at Risk* is also sometimes credited with ending the long-standing threat to dissolve the Department. In fact, by 1984, governmentwide discussions of budget cuts no longer included mention of the Department’s budget, a dramatic change in White House policy. The interest raised by the report helped House Republicans discover the political power of having an education plank in the Party platform and led them to call for a reversal in the Party’s traditional stand on Federal involvement in education for the 1984 election year. Noted Bell, “After its sound defeat at the Republican National Convention, dissolution of the Department will not, in my opinion, ever again be a serious issue.”

**In stern language, A Nation at Risk described a national education system responsible for a “rising tide of mediocrity.”**

**From Supporting Role to Lead Actor (1985–1993)**

Terrel Bell’s administration may have secured the continued existence of the Department, but William Bennett, Reagan’s next appointee, secured its fame. During the course of his four years in office, Bennett crisscrossed the country to deliver speeches, teach sample lessons, critique the culture of higher education, espouse the virtues of a grounding in traditional Western thought, and most of all put education at the forefront of the national consciousness. Like his President, Bennett was not convinced of the need for a Cabinet-level agency for education, but he
did recognize that the Department could be a tool for inspiring a national discourse on education.30 Bennett came to the Department with several goals in mind, not the least of which were carryovers from the Reagan agenda not fully implemented during Bell’s stint in office, like a complete reorganization of the Department and the elimination of the National Institute of Education.31 But Bennett brought a deeper agenda to his office than just the will of his President. He wanted to make significant changes to the way the Federal government handled student loans, going beyond the demonstrated-need clause added by Bell to include recommendations in 1987 to reduce the total student aid budget by 45 percent.32 Most significant, though, and the goal for which Bennett is probably most vividly remembered, were his efforts to reintroduce the idea of a core curriculum for all schools based on major Western thought.33 Many of his recommendations for and critiques of all levels of schooling incorporated his belief in the ultimate value of curricula that paid special attention to these cornerstones of Western civilization and to his own “Three C’s” (Content, Character, and Choice).34

Along with Bennett’s demonstration lessons and the state-by-state speeches, the Department established a tradition of producing a steady stream of documents intended for the general public as well as for the school community that outlined and expanded on Department goals and philosophy. The major publications during Bennett’s tenure included What Works: Research about Teaching and Learning (1986), First Lessons (1986), James Madison High School (1987), James Madison Elementary School (1988), and the follow-up to Bell’s A Nation at Risk, titled American Education: Making it Work (1988).

Before Reagan’s term drew to a close, Bennett decided to leave office so that he could feel free to “speak his mind” during the coming campaign.35 He left behind a Department and a Federal government that had undergone significant changes during his term. Some observers believed that his confrontational manner had been responsible for preventing many education ideas from gaining momentum at the national level;36 for instance, in 1986, Congress was primed to overhaul the 1965 Higher Education Act, but changes were limited by what critics saw as a defensive stand against an Administration that had launched heated attacks against the legislation.37 Indeed, much legislation was passed during his term that limited the role future Secretaries could play in national education policy.38 Despite these changes, however, the Federal role in education at all levels remained strong. For example, in the Spring before Bennett’s departure, Congress completed a landmark reauthorization of the ESEA of 1965, the Johnson-era Great Society program that dramatically increased Federal support for public schools by providing funding to benefit economically disadvantaged students. The Act had undergone several reauthorizations before, but with this reauthorization Federal emphasis moved away from ensuring that states and localities complied with regulations to concentrating on the academic achievement of the disadvantaged students the Act had been designed to benefit.
It came as some surprise when Ronald Reagan chose Texas Tech University president Lauro F. Cavazos to succeed William Bennett in 1988. Cavazos was in almost every respect Bennett’s polar opposite; his mild demeanor and “quiet deportment” stood in direct contrast to Bennett’s forceful and sometimes aggressive approach to dealing with Congress and educators. This total change in the character of the Department was interpreted as a calculated attempt to support the campaign image of Vice-President George H. W. Bush, who promised to be the Education President. Bush would not have to compete with Cavazos for media coverage on education issues like he might have with someone like Bennett.

Three major goals defined Cavazos’ administration once Bush took office: generating public support for the national goals developed by President Bush and the governors after a landmark 1989 National Education Summit; encouraging school-choice rights for parents; and improving and defending the Department’s much-maligned student loans programs. Bush released a seven-part education plan in April 1989 that recommended rewarding high-achieving students and successful schools, but critics charged that the plan should have addressed low achievers and needy schools instead. Bush responded by participating in the now-famous National Governors Association (NGA) Education Summit later that year in Charlottesville, Virginia. By 1990, the group had developed a list of six national education goals toward which the nation should strive before the year 2000, the first in a series of similar goals outlined by future Department administrations. The six goals advocated by the NGA were to:

1. ensure that all children started school ready to learn;
2. achieve a high school completion rate of 90 percent;
3. improve achievement for all Americans in all basic subjects;
4. make American students first in the world in math and science;
5. ensure that all adults were literate and had access to lifelong learning opportunities; and finally
6. make all schools safe, disciplined, and drug-free.

During this period, the Department also faced a growing crisis in the Federal student loan programs. Default rates of 15 percent on Federal student loans led to about $2 billion annually in unpaid fees, and the situation did not appear to be improving. Cavazos responded to the crisis first by putting in place new regulations for eligibility for student loans that met with general approval. The regulations were not as stifling as some proposed earlier by Bennett, but they were stiff enough to please an edgy Congress. On the heels of the Department’s publication of three reports on higher education, Cavazos also asked colleges to hold down tuition increases, and he suggested that the media could help correct the misperception that most colleges were out of reach financially for many students.

When Cavazos stepped down in December 1990, he left behind a Department with a new appreciation for the plight of lower-income and minority students and a more open attitude toward working with educational institutions, most especially colleges. But larger tasks like the preparation of the Administration’s recommendations for the reauthorization of the 1965 Higher Education Act loomed ahead for the next Secretary.
Lamar Alexander, Bush’s next Secretary, was expected to work not only on the Higher Education Reauthorization Act but also on the by now languishing national goals developed at the Education Summit. His first immediate challenge, however, was to address growing furor over a controversial Department statement that scholarships designated specifically for minorities were illegal.48 The statement followed closely on the heels of Bush’s veto of the 1990 Civil Rights Act, which he contended would lead to employment quotas.49 Alexander decided that, under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, race-specific scholarships should be considered illegal, but there were exceptions to that rule that could aid minority students, and in December 1991 the Department proposed an official ban on setting aside general fund scholarship money for race-based scholarships. In response to heavy criticisms, the Department delayed implementation of the ban in June 1992, and the issue would not be resolved until a Federal appeals panel challenged the ban in 1993.50

To address the Education Summit goals, the Department developed the seminal America 2000 plan. Within a week of taking office, Alexander presented the White House with a blueprint for national school reform that incorporated those goals as well as some of the ideas he had developed both as governor and as chair of the National Governor’s Association.51 He often referred to the plan as a “crusade” rather than a program,52 and critics and supporters alike picked up on the terminology. In addition to the six goals established by the NGA, America 2000 recommended merit pay and alternative certification paths for teachers, a longer school year, improved adult literacy programs, national standards in core subjects and voluntary achievement tests to measure progress in those subjects (the American Achievement Tests), and a private-industry-supported think-tank, the New American Schools Development Corporation, that would support innovative education research. Most controversial, however, were the only two components for which the Federal government was to provide substantial money: creation of 535 New American Schools—one model school per Congressional district—and a call for parental school choice.53

The issue of choice became the most contentious aspect of the new plan. The choice debate had its roots in a voucher system proposal first made by economist Milton Friedman in 1955, and the influential John Chubb and Terry Moe book, *Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools* (Brookings, 1990), breathed new life into the idea. The America 2000 plan died in the Senate in 1992, but even without Federal endorsement, choice experiments sprung up around the country.54 Alexander predicted that “[f]ive years from now, Choice will not be an issue,”55 but it has turned out to be one of the more enduring education debates of the past decade.

The Department Steps into the New Century (1993–2001)

The Department had grown steadily since its inception, coordinating over 200 programs by 1993,56 but it had yet to benefit from long-term leadership in the top post. When President Clinton appointed former South Carolina Governor Richard Riley to be the his new Secretary, past history indicated that he would remain in the position for no more than four years. Instead, Clinton became the first President to begin and end his term with the same Secretary of Education.
The first item on Riley’s and the administration’s agenda was the preparation and implementation of the Administration’s plan to encourage nationwide standards-based education. The administration hoped to complete the work begun by the governors at former President Bush’s Charlottesville conference (at which then-Governor Clinton had been an active participant) and continued by former Secretary Alexander in his America 2000 plan. The result was Goals 2000, a plan for education that would codify all of the previous work on introducing standards as part of the national education agenda. The purpose of the Goals 2000 package was threefold: to promote the achievement of national education goals by the year 2000; to raise expectations for parents, teachers, and students with the aid of high standards; and to give state and local reform efforts greater flexibility and more support. The plan was built around the six goals of the Charlottesville conference, plus two new goals included at the insistence of Congress:

7. improve teacher preparation and
8. promote parents’ involvement in all aspects of their children’s growth.

Despite controversy over the issue of national standards and other components of Goals 2000, the plan survived votes in the House and Senate in Spring 1994.

Goals 2000 marked a major shift in Federal education policy away from concerns about the process and quality of program implementation toward a focus on outcomes and accountability for programs, but it was light on content. The 1994 reauthorization of the ESEA, however, not only provided states with more funds but also more guidance and less rhetoric. The Department of Education and the Clinton Administration recommended sweeping changes to the ESEA (referred to as the Improving America’s Schools Act, or IASA, in 1994) that would not have been possible without the passage of Goals 2000. As well as renewing and increasing funding for critical programs like Title I, IASA continued the process of moving Federal concern away from regulations and toward flexibility in the use of funding. The final version of the bill met with criticisms from all sides, but the greatest concern was over the continued push for standards-based reform. Though Secretary Riley himself acknowledged that he supported multiple measures for determining educational progress, standards-based reform became a fixture in the Clinton Administration’s and the Department’s education philosophy, a trend that continued in the next Administration.

Participants in the 1994 Republican Revolution attempted once again to dismantle the Department, and although their effort was ultimately unsuccessful, the Federal role in education and the security of the Department itself remained uncertain until President Clinton’s 1997 State of the Union Address, which reinstated the Federal role in education once again. In his speech, the President outlined 10 goals for education, some of which grew out of the language of Goals 2000. The Department responded by developing seven priorities based on the President’s 10 points and used them as a platform on which to build the Department’s Strategic Plan for 1997. One of the most important results of this plan and subsequent budget requests was the growth in Federal support for charter schools, publicly funded schools not run under public school guidelines but held to the same standards. The spirit of goal-setting and reform continued at the Department through the end of Riley’s term,
United States Secretaries of Education

Shirley M. Hufstedler, a former Federal Court judge, was the first Secretary of Education. She was appointed by President Jimmy Carter in 1979 to oversee the formation of the Department and served until 1981.

Terrel H. Bell was a former Commissioner of Education when education was still housed in the larger Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Dr. Bell was appointed Secretary by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and he served until 1985. He died in 1996.

William J. Bennett, former Chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities, succeeded Bell at Reagan’s request in 1985 and served until 1988, when he stepped down to pursue other education policy interests. He later served as the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Lauro F. Cavazos was appointed Secretary toward the end of Reagan’s second term in 1988. A former President of Texas Tech University, Dr. Cavazos continued to serve as Secretary for the first two years of the Bush presidency, stepping down in 1990.

Lamar Alexander was selected by President Bush to succeed Cavazos in 1991. He served previously as President of the University of Tennessee system, and, before that, as Governor of Tennessee. Mr. Alexander remained Secretary until 1993, and he was later a Republican candidate for president.

Richard W. Riley was appointed by President Bill Clinton at the beginning of his first term in 1993 and remained Education Secretary until 2001, the longest-serving Secretary to date. Mr. Riley served as state Senator and later Governor for South Carolina before being appointed to the post.

Roderick Paige was appointed Secretary by President George W. Bush in 2001. He came to the post after serving as Dean of the College of Education at Texas Southern University and as Superintendent for the Houston Independent School District.
culminating in a significant budget package endorsed by the President shortly before leaving office that included increases for Title I and over $1 billion for the revitalization of school buildings.68

The main focus of the Department during Riley’s term was primary and secondary education, but Riley oversaw several important milestones in higher education as well. Early in Riley’s term, the Department helped develop the Student Loan Reform Act, which allowed the Federal government to make direct loans to students,69 and the School-to-Work Opportunity Act, which increased technology education for students who planned to enter the workforce immediately after high school.70 The Department also reduced student loan default rates to their lowest level ever, increased Pell Grants by more than $1000, expanded college work-study funding to more than $1 billion for the first time, and introduced higher education tax credits, claimed by over 10 million families in 1999.71

In 2001, Republican control returned to the White House and subsequently to the Department, but the Republican Party now directing the national education agenda was very different from the Party that had fought so hard to block and then abolish the Department twenty years before. Since that time, beginning with the first President Bush, the Republican Party had added an education plank to its platform; Candidate George W. Bush even called education the most important item on his agenda. In fact, Bush’s first education budget called for an increase over the final budget established by the Clinton White House,72 which already included the largest single-year increase in education funding. The Administration identified as its primary goals closing the achievement gap between white students and minority and underprivileged students, reauthorizing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and developing a voucher plan to facilitate school choice. The method for implementing these plans would be tightened accountability through mandatory testing and reporting.73 Several of these proposals were direct descendants of the policies developed during Alexander’s and Riley’s terms.

Bush tabbed fellow Texan Roderick Paige to be the seventh Secretary of Education and to lead the charge to develop and enforce his education policies. The Department’s first task under Paige was to tackle the ever-present higher education loan issues. Contrary to Democratic fears and some Republican hopes, the Department made no move to eliminate the direct-lending program begun by Clinton and Riley.74 The Department also initiated a major modernization of the student aid system to reduce loan fraud and abuse and to continue the reduction of the student loan default rate.75 Perhaps most importantly, the Administration proposed a new Pell Grant ceiling for first-year students of $5,100, a boost of over 50 percent from the previous level of $3,300.76

The centerpiece of the Bush Administration’s and the Department’s efforts in 2001 was the development and eventual passage of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, a long-delayed reauthorization of the ESEA. The four principles underlying the NCLB Act were stronger accountability for results, increased flexibility and local control,
expanded options for parents and students, and dependence on proven teaching methods.\textsuperscript{77} The most significant component of the reauthorization plan, and the one likely to be remembered as the most important to the future of the Department, was the requirement that all states develop “challenging state standards” that would be measured annually with state tests, which in turn would be measured against a national benchmark test.\textsuperscript{78} In exchange for these stronger accountability standards, states and localities would be granted greater spending flexibility, a proposal first floated at the NGA meeting in Charlottesville.\textsuperscript{79} One of the most anticipated and hotly debated aspects of the plan was the degree to which the new legislation would allow for the creation of vouchers. The Administration dropped the vouchers idea early in the process in an effort to forge bipartisan compromise,\textsuperscript{80} but the final plan still requires school districts to accommodate the transfer of Title I students from chronically failing schools to other public or charter schools. President Bush signed the bill into law in January 2002,\textsuperscript{81} less than one year from the day he took office.

\textbf{Looking Backward, Moving Forward}

Since 1980, the Department has brought many changes to the face of the national education debate, and it has demonstrated its resiliency and its ability to remain relevant despite a rapidly changing policy arena. From a small program once shunned by the White House and attacked as an unnecessary intrusion into the workings of the nation’s education systems, the Department has grown into a major policy force in primary, secondary, and higher education at national, state, and even local levels. The humble Office in the bowels of HEW that at one time handled only 1 percent of all Federal expenditures on education now boasts control of around 45 percent of Federal education outlays.\textsuperscript{82} Education has always been and will remain a responsibility of the states—after all, the Federal government is still the smallest financial contributor to primary and secondary education efforts—but the growth of the Department of Education from its first tentative years to the present demonstrates that education has established itself in the Federal and national consciousness as a critical arena for national support and leadership.

Paralleling and supporting this development has been the steady rise in interest among presidents in the role the White House can play in the nation’s approach to education. Over the past decade, the level of interaction among the White House, the Department, and the national education agenda has slowly matured. The current Administration, for example, has been much more involved in education program reauthorizations than any previous Administration, and some observers note that for the first time the Secretary of Education has played just a minor role in their development and passage.\textsuperscript{83} Perhaps it is not so much that the Secretary’s role has diminished but that the Executive branch’s role as a whole has increased. How this change will affect the continued influence of the Department of Education remains to be seen.
Endnotes

1. Thomas 19 (1975)
2. Radin and Hawley 22-23 (1988); Committee 76-77 (1980)
7. Radin and Hawley 82 (1988)
15. “Interview” 7 (1980)
22. Bell 490 (1986)
31. “Highlights” A24 (1988); Bennett was successful in his effort with respect to NIE, blending the Nixon-created institute into its mother organization, the Office of Educational Research (OERI) (Sniegoski [2001])
34. Sniegoski (2001)
38. Wilson A28 (1988); for example, the Secretary can no longer set the formulas to determine student eligibility for financial aid.
40. Spring 99-100 (1998)
41. DeLoughry A18 (1990a)
42. Wilson A24 (1989)
44. Cavazos (1991)
45. DeLoughry A1, A24 (1990c)
46. DeLoughry A1, A26 (1990b); some critics suggested that the perception of widespread high tuition was more the fault of the Bennett administration than of the media and that the Department of Education had not increased aid rates to match inflation.

47. DeLoughry A1, A18 (1990a)


49. Sanders 16 (1990)


52. Kaplan 8 (1991)


54. Shapiro and Allis (1991)

55. quoted in Allis 61 (1991)

56. Donohue (1994)

57. Stanfield (1994)


59. Donohue (1994)


61. Stanfield (1994)


63. Lewis 63, 62 (2000)

64. Burd A31 (2000)

65. The priorities were to ensure that (1) all students read independently by the end of 3rd grade, (2) all students mastered challenging math by the end of 8th grade, (3) all 18 year olds were both prepared for and able to afford college, (4) all states established standards and accountability measures and strategies to meet those standards, (5) all teachers were adequately prepared, (6) Internet connections were in all schools, and (7) schools were strong, safe, drug-free places of learning. (“U.S.” [1997])

66. “U.S.” (1997). As a result of the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), the Department is required to develop a Strategic Plan on a regular basis. The 1997 plan was the second such plan; the first was completed in 1994.


68. See, for instance, Cooper (1994) and “Politicians” (2001)

69. “U.S.” (1997)

70. Stanfield (1994)


72. Branch 12 (2001)

73. Keebler (2001); Richard and Sack 36 (2001)

74. Gose 42 (2001)

75. “Paige” 9 (2001)

76. Gehring 21 (2001); Paige (2001)

77. “No Child” (2002)

78. “No Child” (2002); Kiely and Henry (2001)


80. Scheiber (2001)


82. Sniegoski (2001)

83. Scheiber (2001)
Bibliography


Kiely, Kathy, and Tamara Henry. “Will No Child Be Left Behind?” USA Today. 17 December, 2001: 4D.


D. T. Stallings is a candidate for a Master's in Public Policy at Duke University. He earned his teacher's certification while an undergraduate at Duke and has since taught at the middle and high school levels and has worked on primary and secondary education issues in Virginia and North Carolina for the past ten years.
The mission of the Center for Child and Family Policy at Duke University is to solve problems facing children in contemporary society by bringing together scholars from many disciplines with policy makers and practitioners. The center is addressing issues of education reform, youth violence, early child care, and child maltreatment. It is home to the largest violence-prevention study ever funded by the National Institute of Mental Health, the largest youth-violence-prevention experiment for middle schools ever funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a major effort to evaluate the effects of education reforms on children across North Carolina, and a new effort to prevent child maltreatment in the community of Durham, North Carolina.